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THE  PURPOSE of this paper is to bring to the attention of a larger, 
nonspecialized  audience  a possible change  in policy that  may  have wide 
and costly ramifications:  deregulation  of natural  gas prices. There is 
some value in making even rough "guesstimates" of the economic 
implications  of price deregulation  because of the general  bias that both 
economists and  businessmen  have in favor of deregulation.  I 
It is easy to support that bias. Anyone who looks into gas price 
regulation  even superficially  will find  a host of "horror  stories"  concern- 
ing resource allocation  and seemingly  arbitrary  conferment  of benefits. 
Gas prices at the wellhead vary from under $0.50 per thousand  cubic 
feet to over $8.00. Distribution  companies  that  have access to much  low- 
price  gas can afford  to pay great  premiums  for  extra  gas, which  they then 
mix with the low-price gas and sell to the ultimate users (a practice 
known  as rolled-in  pricing). 
Deregulation  of gas prices would eventually eliminate  these alloca- 
tional  and  distributional  distortions,  at least after  existing  contracts  have 
expired. But deregulation  would have other consequences that, when 
taken altogether, might well be far worse than the distortions. The 
magnitude  of these effects-redistribution from  consumers  to producers, 
macroeconomic  impacts,  and  increased  dependence  on oil imports,  each 
of which is discussed below in turn-depends  greatly on the extent 
to which the existing price regulations  have suppressed  gas prices. It is 
widely assumed that gas competes directly  with oil, especially residual 
1. For a recent representative  statement  in favor of deregulation,  see Committee  for 
Economic  Development,  Energy Prices and Public Policy (Washington,  D.C., July 1982). 
The  project  directors  were Thomas  C. Schelling  and  Grant  Thompson. 
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fuel oil in industrial  uses and  distillate  fuel oil in residential  and  commer- 
cial space heating, and therefore  that gas at the burner  tip should and 
would, without the existing regulations,  command  a similar  price on a 
heat-equivalent  basis. Wellhead  gas prices would then be determined 
after  allowing  for the costs of pipeline  transportation  and  distribution  to 
consumers. Because on average gas prices have been well below oil 
prices on a heat-equivalent  basis, it is generally  assumed  that complete 
deregulation  of gas prices would lead to a sharp  jump in the average 
price of natural gas-on  the order of 50 percent at the burner tip 
(somewhat less for residential  use, more for industrial  use), and even 
more  at the wellhead. 
For reasons that are discussed below, there is good reason to doubt 
that the equilibrium  price of gas would jump by anything  like these 
amounts upon complete gas price deregulation  in 1982  or 1983, and it 
might  not increase at all. However, under  existing contractual  arrange- 
ments actual gas prices would  jump by a large amount-perhaps even 
more than 50 percent on average-upon  immediate decontrol, not 
because of competition with oil but because of the requirements  of 
existing contracts, leading  to a substantial  temporary  movement  of gas 
prices above their equilibrium  price. In view of this likely increase, the 
analysis that follows proceeds on the assumption  that gas deregulation 
would in fact lead to a sharp  jump in gas prices. 
Before turning  to those issues, however, it will be useful to provide  a 
brief history and some essential explanation  concerning  the regulation 
and  use of natural  gas in the United States. 
Background 
Gas  price  regulation  by the  federal  government  began  with  the Natural 
Gas Act of 1938;  state regulation  goes back even further.  The 1938  act 
authorized  the government to regulate the price of gas sold to local 
distributors  and ultimate  consumers  by pipeline  companies  engaged  in 
interstate commerce. Pipelines were considered a natural  monopoly 
calling for such regulation. Within its domain a pipeline was often a 
monopoly  seller of gas and a monopsonistic  buyer  of gas. Regulation  of 
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companies owned by pipeline companies, to prevent intracompany 
transfer  pricing  from thwarting  the purposes of the Natural  Gas Act. 
Then in 1954  the Supreme  Court  ruled  that  the Federal  Power  Commis- 
sion's authority  also extended to independent  gas producers  who sold 
to pipelines engaged in interstate  commerce. Gas moving in intrastate 
commerce was left unregulated  by federal authorities,  although  some 
states continued  to regulate. 
This situation  prevailed  until 1978.  Between 1954  and  its peak  in 1973, 
natural  gas production  in the United States more  than  doubled.  Produc- 
tion exceeded additions  to proven reserves after 1967,  and in the mid- 
1970s  gas shortages  developed and curtailments  of gas use were intro- 
duced to ration  the limited supplies in interstate  commerce, where gas 
prices were below those in the more lightly regulated  intrastate  com- 
merce. 
This regulatory  regime  was substantially  altered  with  the Natural  Gas 
Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978. This act extended federal  jurisdiction  to 
intrastate  gas and divided gas into twenty-four  different  categories  for 
regulatory  purposes.  Its  ultimate  objective  was to reduce  the  discrepancy 
between gas prices and oil prices by introducing  a phased and partial 
scheme for deregulation  of gas prices. Certain  unconventional  sources 
of gas (gas from depths below 15,000  feet, from Devonian shale, from 
coal seams, and from geopressurized  brines) were decontrolled  as of 
November 1979. "New"  gas-from  wells developed after April 20, 
1977-and gas dedicated to intrastate  commerce before that date is to 
be decontrolled  on January  1, 1985, or in mid-1987,  depending  on the 
exact status of the gas. Old gas dedicated  to interstate  commerce  is to 
remain  under control indefinitely, subject to a price escalation factor 
equal  to the GNP deflator  plus 0.2 percent  a year. New gas is also subject 
to escalation  while  it remains  under  price  control;  typically  the escalation 
is somewhat  higher,  running  as high  as the GNP  deflator  plus  4.2 percent 
a year. The president or Congress can reimpose price controls under 
NGPA  for  a period  of up  to eighteen  months  after  decontrol  has  occurred. 
This regime  of phased  and  partial  decontrol  was conceived  before  the 
second  major  increase  in  oil prices  (1979-80)  and  relied  on the  assumption 
that  world  oil prices would be about  $15  a barrel  in 1985.  The escalation 
of price  ceilings  between 1978  and 1985-87  was keyed  to this  assumption. 
With  much  higher  oil prices, execution of the NGPA holds the prospect 
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Table  1.  Profile  of U.S.  Energy  Consumption,  1981 
Quadsa 
Sector 
Primary  Residential  and  Electric 
energy source  commercial  Industrial  Transportation  utilities  Totalb 
Coal  0.2  3.1  . ..  12.7  16.0 
Natural gas  7.4  8.0  0.6  3.8  19.8 
Petroleum  3.1  8.1  18.5  2.2  32.0 
Nuclear  energyc  . .  .  . ..  . .  .  2.9  2.9 
Hydro and other 
powerc  ...  ...  ...  3.1  3.1 
Total primary  10.7  19.2  19.2  24.6  73.8 
Electricityd  15.0  9.6  ...  (24.6) 
Total energy 
consumed  25.7  28.9  19.2  ...  73.8 
Source:  U.S.  Department of Energy,  Monthly Energy Review,  May  1982, pp. 20-25. 
a.  One quad is equal to  1015  Btu. 
b.  Some  components  may not add to totals due to rounding. 
c.  Converted  at the fossil  fuel equivalent  for thermal power generation. 
d.  Including losses  in generation  and transmission.  Electricity  sales  were 7.2 quads. 
istration  argued  in 1981  that for a variety  of reasons immediate  deregu- 
lation of gas prices was desirable.  Congressional  and public  opposition 
prevented  action then, but the issue remains  a live one. 
Before proceeding  further,  a word should be said about the relation 
between gas and other types of energy in the U.S. economy and about 
the different  sources and categories  of gas. Table 1 presents  a profile  of 
U.S.  energy consumption in 1981, measured in quads.2  Natural gas 
accounted for about 27 percent of total energy consumption.  Of total 
gas, 19  percent  was used as boiler  fuel for electric  power and  40 percent 
by industry  for all purposes, including  boiler  fuel, which competes with 
residual  fuel oil and coal. This contrasts  with gas use in Europe, where 
relatively  little is used as boiler  fuel. 
2.  Units of measurement  are exceptionally  confusing  in the energy  field. Americans 
usually  measure  natural  gas in cubic  feet, which  when  dry  (so it is mostly  methane)  has a 
heat content  of 1,026  British  thermal  units  (Btu), plus or minus  several  Btu depending  on 
the exact constituents  of the  gas. So a thousand  cubic  feet is about  1  million  Btu.  Elsewhere 
in the world  the unit  of measurement  is the cubic  meter,  which  equals  35.3  cubic  feet. 
The heat content of a barrel  of crude  oil also varies with its exact constituents,  but 
averages  about  5.8 million  Btu, the equivalent  of about  5,650  cubic  feet of gas. A million 
billion  Btu  is called  a quad,  which  is approximately  the heat  content  of a trillion  cubic  feet 
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There are several sources of gas. About one-fifth of the U.S.  gas 
supply is produced in association with oil. The remainder  of  U.S. 
domestic production  is nonassociated  gas. Just over 4 percent  of total 
supply is imported.  Of this, most comes by pipeline  from Canada  and 
Mexico, but some gas is imported  in liquified  form (LNG), and small 
amounts  of gas come from  Alaska  as LNG. 
About  two-thirds  of U.S. domestic  production  in 1980  was "old" gas, 
not scheduled  for deregulation  under  NGPA, and  the remainder  is to be 
deregulated  in 1985-87.  The share  of this old gas will decline  to less than 
one-half by 1985 as old wells are depleted and new ones come into 
production.  If the Alaskan  gas pipeline  is completed  on schedule,  which 
now seems unlikely, about 0.76 trillion  cubic feet of Alaskan gas will 
begin to flow into the lower forty-eight  states by late 1986,  and its price 
will be regulated. 
Economic Effects of Price Deregulation:  Allocation 
The efficiency gains from deregulation  are especially attractive  to 
economists;  it is their  specialty.  Deregulation  will  promote  development 
of the sources of supply  with  lowest costs. In particular,  drilling  for high- 
cost sources of gas, such as that below 15,000  feet for which there is 
incentive  under  NGPA, will presumably  give way to less costly sources 
of supply.  There  will also be some rationalization  of consumption,  partly 
away from cheap gas, partly among users of gas, although  how much 
misallocation  exists is unclear.  Some industrial  users are  now subject  to 
"incremental"  pricing,  for instance, and have to pay more  for their  gas 
than  do residential  and  commercial  users. There  are marked  differences 
in price among  various  regions  of the country,  only partly  explained  by 
distribution  costs, and these differences may influence  the location of 
some industrial  activity. Also, the unsatisfied  demand  for gas that is 
alleged to exist could be satisfied, although  it is not clear how much 
actually  exists. Some of these points are discussed  further  below. 
The Department of Energy has attempted to estimate the "real 
resource costs" saved by immediate  decontrol of energy prices. This 
estimate appears  in the most comprehensive  study that has been done 
to date  on the effects of gas price  deregulation,  and  I refer  to it frequently 
below. The DOE's estimate  of real  resource  savings  from  immediate  gas 376  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
price  deregulation  is small at first, but reaches $2 to $3 billion  a year in 
1980  dollars  by the late 1980s.3 
This  estimate  is described  as "the area  under  the domestic  gas supply 
curve," or, more  accurately,  the difference  between that  area  under  the 
reference  regime,  which is that prescribed  in the NGPA, and  that  under 
immediate  (January  1982)  and  complete  decontrol  at the wellhead.  This 
savings  is not a huge sum, but it is sufficiently  large  that  it should  not be 
ignored.  It is worth noting, however, that most of the resources saved 
in this estimate simply result from lower gas production,  not greater 
efficiency in the production  of a given volume of gas. For instance, by 
1990  the resources "saved" by immediate  decontrol  in comparison  with 
decontrol  under  the NGPA come to $3.0 billion  in 1980  dollars;  of this, 
$2.5 billion  is from  a lower level of gas production,  and  only $0.5 billion 
is from improvements  in efficiency. On the other hand, perhaps the 
United States should not be producing  so much  gas, and the resources 
released  can be better  used elsewhere. This issue is taken  up  below. For 
the moment  the allocational  gains can be reckoned  to be between $0.5 
billion  and $3.0 billion  a year in 1980  dollars. 
Distributional Effects of Price Regulation 
In addition  to allocational  effects, there  are  distributional  effects from 
decontrols. These have long been acknowledged  by economists, but 
leave today's economists uneasy because they do not know how to 
evaluate them. In keeping with current practice, the effects will not 
be dealt with here, except to note two points. First, already  developed 
natural  gas probably  comes as close as possible to a realistic  example  of 
a product  with a pure rent. Once the well has been drilled  and the gas- 
gathering  facilities installed, price increases represent  a pure windfall. 
This point is acknowledged in the DOE Study cited above, which 
observes: "The change  in the producer  surplus  . ..  is likely to approxi- 
mate the change in before-tax income because most of the change is 
from  increased  revenues  from  gas that  would  be produced  under  current 
3. U.S. Department  of Energy, Office  of Policy, Planning  and Analysis, A Study  of 
Alternatives  to the Natural  Gas Policy  Act of 1978 (DOE,  November  1981), (hereafter 
referred  to as DOE Study),  Appendix  C, "Macroeconomic  Consequences  of Natural  Gas 
Decontrol,"  DOE/PE-0035,  p. 9. Richard N.  Cooper  377 
policies."4  To be sure, there is some margin  for further  development  of 
existing  fields, and  surface  equipment  must  be maintained  and  occasion- 
ally replaced  to keep wells operating.  The NGPA allows for the costs 
associated  with such maintenance  and extension. But the potential  for 
further  development  of existing fields is limited  compared  with oppor- 
tunities for new gas exploration and development. In an economy 
sensitive to supply-side  considerations,  a tax on old gas (price  controls 
being a "tax" whose "revenues" are passed directly to consumers) 
probably  comes as close as possible to a tax with minimal  undesirable 
incentives, at least on the production  side. 
Second, if, as is generally  assumed, gas prices rise sharply  following 
decontrol, the redistribution  from consumers to  producers will be 
strikingly  large. The DOE Study  estimated  that price decontrol  in early 
1982 would have raised the average wellhead price from $2.09 per 
thousand  cubic feet in 1981  to $4.19 in 1982  (in 1980  dollars,  deflated  by 
an estimate of the GNP deflator).5  This price increase, passed on to 
consumers with no further escalation by distributors,  would transfer 
about $38 billion (1980 dollars) a year from gas consumers to gas 
producers on the volume of gas assumed to be consumed following 
decontrol. Under the NGPA average  gas prices would have risen only 
$0.18 per thousand  cubic feet from 1981  to 1982,  so over 90 percent of 
the transfer  can be attributed  to decontrol.  A substantial  but indetermi- 
nant  amount  of the transfer  to producers-$1I1  billion  (in 1980  dollars)  in 
one estimate-would  be recouped in income, royalty, and severance 
taxes;  but  even after  allowing  for that, an astounding  transfer  would  take 
place in a single year.6 
4. DOE Study, Appendix  D, "Distributional  Consequences  of Natural  Gas Decon- 
trol," DOE/PE-0036,  p. 41. 
5. DOE  Study,  Appendix  A, "Two  Market  Analysis  of Natural  Gas  Decontrol,"  DOE/ 
PE-0033,  summary  report  tables, REFFUL 82. 
6. The $11 billion  estimate  is from  Dale Jorgenson  Associates. It appears  in the DOE 
Study,  Appendix  C, "Macroeconomic  Consequences,"  pp. 1-12,  I-13.  The  American  Gas 
Association,  a trade  organization  of gas  distributors  which,  in  contrast  to the  DOE,  opposes 
immediate  gas price  decontrol,  finds  an especially  strong  impact  of the price  increases  on 
low-income  households.  It suggests  that the share  of income spent  on gas in households 
with  annual  income  below  $7,000  in 1981  would  rise  from  11  percent  to 19  percent  following 
decontrol.  Its simulation  study shows a larger  price increase  than  does the DOE Study, 
and  a total increase  in expenditures  by gas users of $60 billion. See the AGA, "Cost of 
Immediate  Total  Wellhead  Price  Decontrol  of Natural  Gas to Low Income  and  Disadvan- 
taged  Groups,"  in Natural Gas Supply  Outlook,  Hearings  before the Subcommittee  on 378  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
To determine if a change in policy will improve potential social 
welfare, economists ask whether those who gain from the change can 
compensate the losers and still come out ahead. If the distributional 
effects of gas price decontrol  are this large, and if the allocational  gains 
reported  earlier  are anywhere  near correct, it would take an extraordi- 
nary  effort  for the gainers  to compensate  the losers. Producers  would  be 
left with less, perhaps  much  less, than 10  percent  of the total transfer.  It 
must  be asked  whether  such retransfers,  if they were to take  place, could 
be made  without  affecting  overall  allocational  efficiency  even more  than 
the gas price regulations  do. 
Macroeconomic  Effects 
If  gas prices  increase  so much  that  they create  such  large  distributional 
effects, there is bound also to be a major  macroeconomic  impact. The 
long-run  effect on total output  will be positive to the extent that  the $0.5 
billion  to $3.0 billion  allocational  savings  can be effectively  utilized.  But 
the short-run  effect will be negative. The large  redistribution  will surely 
reduce aggregate  demand in the short run as gas consumers cut their 
nongas spending  (so they can pay higher  gas bills) faster than the high- 
income  producers  increase  their  expenditures  on goods and services, or 
others  increase  their  spending  after  borrowing  in the capital  market.  The 
redistribution  will have an effect similar  to that of the large increase in 
world oil prices in 1974-75 and again  in 1979-80. Some of the gains to 
producers  will be paid  as taxes-$  1 billion  was the figure  cited above- 
so there  will also be a negative  fiscal effect on aggregate  demand,  which 
may be welcome, depending  on the overall  condition  of the economy. 
In addition,  the gas price  increase  will raise  the  general  level of prices. 
(Gas constitutes over 1 percent of the consumer price index and 2.1 
percent  of the producer  price index.) Since other  prices in the economy 
will not automatically  be cut to offset the rise in gas prices, the price 
Fossil and Synthetic Fuels of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 
Representatives,  97 Cong. 1  sess. (Government  Printing  Office,  1982),  serial  97-90,  p. 148. 
Only  about  one-third  of gas consumption  is by residences;  the remainder  would  result  in 
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index must be  stabilized through the medium of weaker aggregate 
demand.  If the Federal  Reserve holds to its present  monetary  targets,  a 
gas-induced  rise in the price level will lead to a decline in economic 
activity. 
The  DOE Study  already  referred  to reports  three  different  simulations 
of the macroeconomic  effects of gas price deregulation,  summarized  in 
table  2. Compared  with policy under  the NGPA, they all show increases 
in the price level and a decline in real GNP during the three years 
following deregulation,  ranging  from $21 billion to $40 billion in 1980 
dollars.  The Jorgenson  model differs  conceptually  from  the other  two in 
that  it focuses exclusively on supply-side  effects: "desired  expenditure 
(demand)  is always consistent with what is achievable from produc- 
tion.  "7 Monetary  aggregates  are implicitly  accommodative,  but there  is 
no wage-price interaction. The Wharton  model and that of Data Re- 
sources Incorporated,  in contrast,  both allow for shortfalls  of aggregate 
demand, and both include some influence of prices on wages. The 
Wharton  model, however, assumes quite an accommodative  monetary 
policy (M2 is 2.6 percent higher  three years after  decontrol  than in the 
reference  case); this is reflected  in the larger  cumulative  price increase 
and the smaller  cumulative  reduction  in output than that shown in the 
DRI simulations,  which assume a steady increase in unborrowed  bank 
reserves regardless  of the rise in prices. 
If the Federal  Reserve aims to keep nominal  GNP on a steady  path, a 
target  that  has  been  frequently  proposed  in  recent  years,  and  if it succeeds 
in attaining  this target  continuously-an admittedly  severe stipulation- 
the loss in output  from gas price deregulation  could be much  higher.  A 
rough  idea  of this magnitude  can  be garnered  by supposing  that  monetary 
policy actions are sufficiently  restrictive to ensure that nominal  GNP 
after gas price decontrol follows the same path that it would in the 
absence of decontrol. Using the Wharton  simulation  reported  by the 
DOE to characterize  the latter situation,  and assuming  that  only half of 
the  resulting  monetary  squeeze  affects  real  output  (the  other  half  lowering 
the general price level), the loss of output following decontrol  for the 
first year would be $26 billion in 1980  dollars, and the three-year  loss 
would be $100 billion. These losses are much higher than the figures 
7. DOE  Study,  Appendix  C, "Macroeconomic  Consequences,"  p. 1-15. 380  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
Table 2.  Estimates of Macroeconomic  Effects of Gas Price Decontrola 
Effect  on real GNP  Effect on GNP  deflator 
(billions of 1980 dollars)  (percent) 
Model  First year  First three years  First year  First three years 
Jorgenson  - 8.5  - 20.9  2.2  1.6 
Wharton 
Econometrics  -11.8  - 27.9  2.5  3.1 
Data Resources 
Incorporated  - 8.9  - 40.0  1.4  2.2 
Source:  Department  of  Energy,  Office of  Policy,  Planning and Analysis,  A Stuidy of Alternatives  to thle Natuiral 
Gas  Policy  Act  of  1978  (DOE,  November  1981),  Appendix  C,  "Macroeconomic  Consequences  of  Natural  Gas 
Decontrol,"  DOE/PE-0035,  pp. 1-  1  6,  11-7, 111-8, 111-1  1. 
a.  Results  are differences  between  simulations  based on the Natural Gas Policy  Act of  1978 and simulations that 
assume  immediate  decontrol  in early  1982. 
given in table 2, and they illustrate starkly the losses  in output that can 
occur from  "exogenous"  price increases  in an environment  in which 
monetary policy successfully  targets nominal GNP. 
These  short-run depressive  effects  could  dominate the allocational 
effects  even in the long run. Output lost forever means lost investment, 
which  lowers  total  output  and labor productivity  in the future.  The 
United States will experience  for many years the enormous costs of the 
Iranian revolution  and the Federal Reserve's  reaction to it. In the DRI 
simulation,  investment  is  reduced  during the first three  years  by  the 
equivalent of 5 percent of one year's investment. 
Oil Imports 
Besides  allocational, distributional, and macroeconomic  effects,  pol- 
icy should also be concerned  with the impact of gas-price decontrol on 
oil imports, hence on U.S.  dependence  on oil from the rest of the world. 
The  costly  impact  of two  major world oil price increases  in the past 
decade  has already been  mentioned.  Four other major disruptions to 
Middle Eastern oil have occurred since  1950, although Americans  are 
less  aware of them because  they  were better able to cope  with them. 
Very likely there will be at least one major disruption in the next decade, 
perhaps more,  and the United  States  should position  itself so that the 
damage will be limited.  That entails many actions (such as building up 
the  Strategic  Petroleum  Reserve),  but among them  is  reducing  U.S. Richard N.  Cooper  381 
dependence  on imported  oil. William  Nordhaus  calculated  the gains  that 
would  flow from  reduced  imports  of oil, taking  into account  the terms  of 
trade  effects and the costs of disruption,  and suggested  that the social 
value  of a barrel  of imported  oil is roughly  twice its price.8  Regardless  of 
the exact estimate, savings from reduced  oil imports  during  periods in 
which the market  is firm  has social value substantially  in excess of its 
price because of the improvement  in the terms of trade such savings 
would permit and, more importantly,  because of the macroeconomic 
costs that would be avoided  if a disruption  in foreign  oil supplies  should 
occur. 
What effect will gas price decontrol have on imported  oil? At first 
blush, it might  seem that raising  gas prices would  induce substitution  of 
oil for gas, or at least slow down the substitution  of gas for oil that has 
been taking  place.9  Once again, the DOE Study  addresses  the question 
in detail, estimating  the impact on gas consumption,  gas supply, and 
substitution  for oil under a variety of assumptions  regarding  both the 
nature  of the change  in policy and the external  economic environment. 
In view of developments  during  the past two years, the DOE's low oil- 
price scenario seems the most realistic of those the study examined. 
This assumes a fall in crude oil prices in 1980  dollars  to $29.60  a barrel 
in 1982,  followed by a 2 percent  a year  increase  in real  terms  at least until 
1995, when the study's simulations  end.10  The DOE assumes that this 
price path is exogenous and that gas prices will rise under  decontrol  to 
those of the Btu equivalent  of residual  fuel oil, with which  gas competes 
at the margin. Under these assumptions, the DOE finds a drop in oil 
imports  for the three years after full decontrol, relative  to what would 
take place under  the NGPA, followed by a gradual  rise in oil imports  in 
subsequent  years. For the entire 1982-95  period, oil imports  would be 
about  700,000  barrels  per day higher  with immediate  full  decontrol.  This 
8. William  D. Nordhaus,  "Oil and Economic  Performance  in Industrial  Countries," 
BPEA, 2.:1980, p. 387. 
9.  Between 1978  and 1981  the electric  utilities  sector  reduced  its consumption  of oil by 
1.6 quads  (7 percent  of its total primary  energy  consumption),  increased  consumption  of 
gas by 0.5 quad, and increased  consumption  of coal by 2.5 quads. In the same period 
industrial  users reduced  their  consumption  of oil by 1.9 quads,  gas by 0.6 quad,  and  coal 
by 0.2 quad, for a total decline of 9 percent in their energy use. Data are from DOE, 
Monthly Energy Review, May 1982,  pp. 23, 25. 
10. The average  OPEC  crude  oil price  in June  1982  was slightly  lower-$28.96 a barrel 
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is not a very great  effect. But it has an undesirable  time profile,  with oil 
savings during the present period of world oil surplus, followed by 
increased oil imports  in the 1985-95 decade, during  which time an oil 
crisis  is more  likely to occur. The macroeconomic  effects would  amplify 
this pattern,  depressing  oil imports  even further  in the early years but 
raising  them in the later years. 
This pattern of impact on oil imports  is determined  by several key 
assumptions:  (1) before  decontrol  there  is an unsatisfied  demand  for gas 
by electric utilities and industry, such that increased  availability  of gas 
following  decontrol  will stimulate  substitution  of gas for oil despite  a rise 
in the price of gas relative to the exogenous price of oil; (2) higher  gas 
prices will discourage consumption  in the residential  and commercial 
sectors, which will result  in lower total energy  consumption  rather  than 
a substitution  of oil for gas; and (3) decontrol  of gas prices will lead to 
additional  domestic gas production  in the years immediately  following 
decontrol,  though  not over a longer  period  of time. 
All three assumptions  need to be questioned,  especially the first  and 
the third.  The DOE assumes a substantial  unsatisfied  demand  for gas in 
1981 (3.5 trillion cubic feet, or about 3.6 quads). The origin of this 
estimate is entirely unclear;  it seems to derive from a demand-for-gas 
schedule based on the a priori assumption that gas competes at the 
margin  directly  with residual  fuel oil at electric  utilities  and  for industrial 
users. This assumption  is crucial  to the otherwise  paradoxical  result  that 
a sharp  relative  increase  in gas prices will stimulate  demand  for gas. It is 
true  that  under  the Powerplant  and  Industrial  Fuel Use Act of 1978  some 
industrial  uses of gas were prohibited.  But waivers  of these prohibitions 
were granted  generously, and restrictions  on gas use by existing plants 
were abolished  in 1981  (although  building  new gas-fired  thermal  electric- 
ity generating  plants is still prohibited). Some areas of the country, 
notably New England  and Florida, seem constrained  in their gas con- 
sumption  by limited pipeline capacity. That can be relaxed in the long 
run  but will not occur at once following  decontrol  and is not dependent 
on decontrol. Apart from this, the supply of gas seems not to be a 
constraint  on its consumption, now or in 1981;  widespread  testimony 
avers that U.S. gas production  is limited  by the lack of demand,  not the 
reverse.  I  I 
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Why is it that firms  do not switch from oil to gas when the latter is 
cheaper?  Gas at the burner  tip has been cheaper  than  the competing  oil 
products  for the past three decades, not only since the sharp  oil price 
rise of 1974.  The reason  partly  no doubt  rests on the greater  flexibility  of 
oil, both in volume and  in sources  of supply.  Memories  of the gas supply 
curtailments  of  1976-77 inhibit heavier dependence on gas. Perhaps 
some potential users hesitate because of the prospects of higher gas 
prices with decontrol, based on their belief that the anticipated  savings 
would  not warrant  the investment.  Perhaps  it is also because  they know, 
DOE statements notwithstanding,  that deregulation  does not assure 
uninterrupted  future supply. Shortages  can and do develop in markets 
not subject to regulation;  and in any case government  policy could 
change  again  and  reintroduce  physical  curtailment-indeed it is likely  to 
do so if serious shortages  were to develop.12 
Two further problems arise with this DOE assumption. First, the 
price  of oil is not exogenous. If deregulation  indeed  would  lead to a drop 
in demand for residual  fuel oil (resid) as a result of increased gas for 
boiler  fuel, the flexible prices of resid would fall, thereby  inhibiting  the 
substitution  of gas for oil in the short run. In the long run, resid can be 
upgraded  to lighter  products  if its price is expected to be low enough  to 
warrant  the heavy investment  required.  But given the shift in world  oil 
production  toward heavier crude oils, a relatively  abundant  supply of 
resid  is likely for some time. 
Second, coal is cheaper  than  gas even at its current  prices, and much 
more so at oil-equivalent  prices. If investments are to be made in the 
long run  on the basis of Btu costs, coal dominates  gas. Obviously  there 
will be both environmental  and locational  obstacles to the universal  use 
of coal as a boiler  fuel during  the next ten to fifteen  years. Delivered  coal 
will be more expensive than gas in a few areas, and antipollution 
investments increase the costs of using coal. But coal is still generally 
cheaper  than gas for base-load  facilities (that  is, the main  generation  of 
12. It is simply  an evasion to claim  that "shortages"  cannot  develop  in a free market 
because price will rise to the point at which the market  is cleared. Would-be  buyers  of 
sugar  in 1974  will remember  the difficulties  they had in finding  it, despite a free market. 
Furthermore,  for the persons driven  out of the market  by high prices, especially if the 
expenditure  is initially a consequential  fraction of their income, there is effectively a 
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electricity,  to which more  flexible  supplemental  peak-load  capacity  may 
be added),  and the switch to coal is likely to continue. 
In short, there is not likely to be much substitution  of gas for oil in 
utility or large industrial  boiler use either in the short or the long run. 
Gas  distributors  apparently  share  this  perception,  for  they have  opposed 
deregulation  of gas prices partly on the grounds  that demand  for gas 
would  fall, not rise. 
The second important  assumption  in the DOE analysis  is that higher 
gas prices will discourage  residential  and commercial  consumption  of 
gas without  inducing  a rise in the demand  for oil. That  is, these users will 
simply  cut their  energy  consumption  when  gas prices  rise. The estimated 
drop in consumption is 540 billion cubic feet, or about 7 percent, in 
response to an initial  price  increase  to them  of 36 percent.  It is probably 
correct that this group of users would not substitute  oil fully for their 
reduced  gas consumption,  but  it seems implausible  that  they would  make 
no substitution  at all. In particular,  the pace of residential  conversion  to 
gas, with new investments  needed by households,  is likely to be slowed 
by a sharp increase in gas prices. Thus oil imports  will be larger  than 
they otherwise  would be. 13 
The third  key assumption  is that  gas price deregulation  will stimulate 
new supplies  of gas, by an estimated  200 to 400 billion  cubic feet a year 
in the three years following  decontrol. It is this increased  supply, along 
with reductions in residential and commercial  demand, that permits 
industrial  consumers  and  utilities  to use more  gas and  thereby  to reduce 
the demand for imported oil. It can be taken for granted  that higher 
wellhead prices will stimulate exploration and development of new 
sources of gas. Average  wellhead  prices of gas have risen sharply  in the 
past decade, from $0.22 per thousand  cubic feet in 1973  to $0.90  in 1978 
13. From  the point  of view of social welfare,  it is unclear  that  a switch  in gas use from 
households  to industrial  boilers-which is what happens  in the DOE simulations-is an 
allocational  improvement.  Gas prices for residences are considerably  higher than for 
electric  power  companies  ($4.56  versus  $2.92  per  thousand  cubic  feet in 1981),  presumably 
reflecting  the higher  costs of distribution  to households.  But from  a social point  of view, 
in the current  context most of those distribution  costs are already  sunk, whereas  new 
investment  would  be required  for industrial  hookups.  If the gap between  burner-tip  price 
and  relevant  marginal  social cost is higher  for  gas sales to households  than  that  for sales to 
industrial  users, which  may  well be the case because  of sunken  fixed  costs of distribution, 
a switch  in gas supplies  from  households  to utilities  and  some  other  industrial  users  would 
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to $2.06  in 1981,  and  this has no doubt  helped  to explain  the sharp  rise in 
new exploratory  and developmental  drilling  since the early 1970s. 
But it is necessary to keep in mind the complexities of the NGPA 
governing  gas price regulation.  Some prices have already  been decon- 
trolled, and others have been allowed to rise sharply,  precisely with a 
view to stimulating  new supplies. These high prices are rolled in with 
the low-priced  old gas for sale to users. With  price deregulation,  some 
of these wellhead prices will certainly  fall,  and to that extent will 
discourage new production, not encourage it. Yet raising  sharply  the 
prices  of old gas may  fail to stimulate  new production.  Thus  deregulation 
of gas prices  will not necessarily  evoke more  supply;  it could  even reduce 
the rate of the past few years at which new proven reserves have been 
found. 
The DOE Study projects a marked  decline in U.S. gas production 
until prices are deregulated  under  the NGPA. This is inconsistent  with 
the essentially steady gas production  that has been observed  during  the 
past three years under gas price regulation  and with the increase in 
proven reserves that has recently occurred.  Moreover,  other  observers 
project much less decline in production  in the early 1980s under the 
NGPA than does the DOE.  14 In view of recent production  and explora- 
tion, the supply estimates in the DOE Study under continued price 
regulation have a sizable downward bias, which in turn imparts an 
upward bias to its estimates of oil savings in the years immediately 
following  deregulation.  If  there  is a decline  in  production  and  a weakening 
of exploration, it is more likely to be because of limited demand  than 
because of inadequate  price incentives relative  to production  or explo- 
ration  costs. 
The net effect of these judgments is to reduce substantially  the oil 
savings that the DOE Study projects in the early years following gas 
price decontrol, and thus to enlarge  the estimate of the increase in oil 
import  dependence that gas price decontrol will bring  about over the 
14. See DOE Study, Appendix C, "Macroeconomic  Consequences," p. 111-53,  in 
which  Wharton  Econometric's  estimate  of U.S. gas production  in 1984  under  the Natural 
Gas Policy Act is over 10 percent  higher  than  the DOE's estimate,  even though  wellhead 
prices  are assumed  to be somewhat  lower (p. 111-36).  Recently  the DOE revised  its own 
estimate  for 1985  upward  by 1.1 trillion  cubic  feet, or about  6 percent.  See Department  of 
Energy, Office of Policy,  Planning, and Analysis,  Energy Projections  to the  Year 2000, 
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entire  period  until 1995.  Whatever  efficiency  gains  may  be brought  about 
by decontrol  could  be overwhelmed  by the cost associated  with  enlarged 
dependence  on imported  oil after 1985. 
In this regard,  gas price deregulation  is very different  from the oil- 
price decontrol that occurred  in 1979-81. Although  oil-price  decontrol 
also could be expected to have some allocative, redistributive,  and 
macroeconomic effects,  it clearly served to reduce markedly U.S. 
dependence  on imported  oil, an important  objective. Decontrol  did this 
both  by stimulating  domestic  oil supply  and  by discouraging  demand  for 
oil. Immediate  gas price deregulation  would be a move in the wrong 
direction  on this dimension  of national  policy. 
Concluding Observations:  Misplaced Analysis? 
If the above analysis of production  and substitution  is valid, it raises 
the interesting  possibility that deregulation  would increase  the average 
equilibrium  price  of gas by much  less than  is generally  assumed.  Demand 
for gas could be satisfied  by existing and prospective  supply  at close to 
existing average prices.15 Only if producers actually reduced their 
production,  perhaps  in anticipation  of higher  prices in the more  distant 
future, would the price increase sharply. And, as noted, incentives to 
develop new sources of gas in the near  future  would  be reduced. 
There would of course be a major  redistribution  of earnings  among 
producers, with producers of old gas earning much more, but with 
currently  decontrolled  and possibly even new gas producers  receiving 
less. In short, perhaps  the widespread  assumption  that  gas prices  would 
15. Indeed,  one line of argument  suggests  that  the average  equilibrium  wellhead  price 
of gas should  not rise at all following  price  decontrol.  Gas extracted  from  great  depths  is 
at present  decontrolled.  Therefore  prices  of deep gas should  have risen,  on Le Chatelier's 
principle  concerning  the equalization  of pressures,  to the point  at  which  the  average  rolled- 
in  gas price  would  clear  the market.  Following  total  decontrol,  below-average  prices  would 
rise, but  they would  be exactly  compensated  by a fall in above-average  prices,  leaving  the 
average  price  unchanged. 
In reality,  the full operation  of this equalization  principle  is thwarted  by the still small 
and  uncertain  quantities  of decontrolled  gas, combined  with an unwillingness  of pipeline 
companies  to make commitments  over the lifetimes of contracts  to prices well above 
present  Btu-equivalent  oil prices. It is also thwarted  by the unavailability  of such gas in 
the producing  areas of some pipeline companies. Nonetheless, the tendency toward 
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rise sharply  to Btu equivalence  with current  oil prices  is incorrect.  If so, 
there would be much more modest redistribution  from consumers to 
producers, and the inflationary  and contractionary  effects of price 
deregulation  would also be more modest, perhaps  even negligible. 
This happy  possibility  is made  unlikely  by several  features  of existing 
gas contracts, which give rise to the "fly-up" problem-a  sharp  initial 
rise of prices, following deregulation,  above the long-run  equilibrium 
price. Many existing contracts between gas producers and pipeline 
companies  are on a "take or pay" basis, whereby pipeline companies 
are committed  to pay for a large  fraction  of the contracted  gas volumes 
whether  or not they take it. Contracts  between pipeline  companies  and 
local distributors,  in turn, set a rather  high  minimum  payment,  whether 
the gas is taken  or not. In addition,  many  contracts  have a most-favored- 
treatment  clause and some have indefinite  escalator clauses linked to 
100 or even 110 percent of distillate fuel oil prices.16 Prices today are 
thus restrained  well below what these contract  escalators  would  call for 
in the absence of regulation.  With  price decontrol, the price escalators 
would  be triggered,  and this combined  with the most-favored-treatment 
clauses would lead to a sharp  jump in wellhead  prices to most pipeline 
companies.  Because of the take-or-pay  clauses, the gas producers  would 
be partially  insulated  from price-induced  weakness in final  demand  for 
gas and could simply conserve any gas not taken. Given U.S. business 
habits and uncertainty  about the short-run  demand  schedule, pipeline 
companies would pass on these price increases to distributors,  and 
distributors  would in the first instance pass them on to gas consumers 
(which  they can typically  do under  the fuel price adjustment  provisions 
of current local public utility regulations).  Thus with deregulation  a 
sharp increase in average prices would be experienced, even in the 
presence of a responsive  decline in final  demand.  Deregulation  would  in 
effect unintentionally  exert the collective short-run  monopoly  power of 
16. According  to a study  of the 20,000  gas-purchase  contracts  on file  with  the Federal 
Energy  Regulatory  Commission,  successor  to the Federal  Power  Commission,  about  two- 
thirds  had indefinite  escalator  clauses. Of those, 8 percent  had price  escalators  linked  to 
distillate  fuel prices and 83 percent  had most-favored-treatment  clauses linking  prices  to 
the one to three highest  contract  prices for the same area. See Congressional  Research 
Service and National Regulatory  Research Institute, Natural Gas Regulation Study, 
prepared  for the Subcommittee  on Fossil and Synthetic  Fuels of the House of Represen- 
tatives, Committee  on Energy  and  Commerce,  97 Cong.  2d sess. (GPO,  1982),  p. 144. 388  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
the nation's gas producers.  Prices would subsequently  decline only as 
rapidly  as the contracts  expired  or as they could be renegotiated  to take 
into account  the actual  demand  for gas. 
If gas  consumption declined markedly in response to  the price 
increases,  distributors  would  feel the  financial  squeeze. Under  prevailing 
institutional  arrangements,  this squeeze could go on for several years 
before  resulting  in a decline in gas prices toward  their  equilibrium  level. 
To reduce their financial  straits, distributors  will appeal  to local public 
utility  regulators  to permit  price discrimination  among  their  customers, 
and in particular  to lower their prices to industrial  users with a high 
elasticity of demand  for gas, arguing,  with some  justification,  that such 
action will also permit  lower prices to other  customers. 
Under these circumstances,  for several years gas price deregulation 
would lead to  the worst possible combination of outcomes: major 
redistribution  from consumers to producers, inflation,  economic con- 
traction leading to unemployment,  an increase in oil imports, and a 
misallocation  of resources-in  this case a movement  from gas to other 
energy sources as well as a reallocation  among  gas users. Comments 
and Discussion 
W. David Montgomery: This is both a good and a treacherous  time to 
discuss the pros and cons of natural  gas regulation.  These two observa- 
tions stem from  the same  fact: natural  gas markets  are  in turmoil  and  are 
drastically  different  from  what  was forecast  as little  as one year  ago. The 
turmoil  has focused attention  on problems  of natural  gas regulation,  but 
the unanticipated  changes in gas markets have made past studies of 
deregulation  obsolete. 
Richard  Cooper has raised a number  of uncertainties  and important 
questions  about  the consequences of deregulation.  It is certainly  appro- 
priate  to take a new look at deregulation,  based on current  gas market 
conditions  and trends. But in doing so I come out with conclusions  that 
are exactly opposite those in the paper. 
To state my disagreement  briefly,  I make  three  general  observations 
and then state without  proof a few conclusions. The first  observation  is 
that natural  gas markets  have changed.  Oil prices have turned  out to be 
much  lower than  the forecasts that were included  in most recent  studies 
and  critiques  of the Natural  Gas Policy Act. Gas prices  are much  higher 
on average, because of various ways in which producers  have adapted 
to the NGPA's price categories and managed  to move gas from low to 
high  price categories without  doing anything  to produce  more  gas. Gas 
demand  is also lower than what was forecast, and large  regional  differ- 
entials  in the cost of gas have appeared. 
The second observation:  to analyze equilibrium  in the gas market, 
one has to start at the burner tip and look at the uses of gas and 
competition  with alternative  fuels. The price of gas at the burner  tip is 
likely to be determined  by competition  with some form of fuel oil. The 
average price at the wellhead will equal the burner  tip price net of 
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transportation  costs,  and will therefore be insensitive to differences 
between partial  and complete deregulation-unless supply response is 
so large  as to shift burner  tip equilibrium  away from the point at which 
the marginal  user is one whose alternative  fuel is residual  fuel oil. 
The third  observation  is that it is necessary in discussing  natural  gas 
deregulation  to pay careful attention to which alternative  scheme of 
deregulation  is being  compared  to which. Perhaps,  having  followed this 
subject  for some time, I am particularly  sensitive to the esoteric distinc- 
tions that the principals  in this debate  always make. 
Current  law, NGPA, occupies an intermediate  position of partial 
deregulation.  As Cooper  mentioned,  some gas is currently  decontrolled. 
In 1985  approximately  50 percent  of gas will become free from  controls 
under present law. That is effective deregulation  in the sense that the 
market  would be cleared  by prices under  the NGPA schedule. 
The alternatives  to partial  deregulation  that  one might  want  to discuss 
are,on one hand,  continued  controls-rolling back  orfreezing  the  current 
ceilings, and on the other, total deregulation-removing controls from 
old gas as well as new. The year in which one makes  these comparisons 
also matters,  because alternatives  that  differ  drastically  in one year  may 
be indistinguishable  in another. For example, Cooper compares total 
deregulation  in 1982 to continued NGPA regulations  in 1982, noting 
massive distributional  consequences. But the cited DOE Study also 
predicted that NGPA would have similarly  massive consequences in 
1985,  compared  to continued  controls. 
I draw the following conclusions from the current  state of the gas 
market  and  the changes  that have occurred  in other  energy  markets. 
First of all, average  gas prices have already  risen and oil prices have 
fallen  so much  that  to a first  approximation,  we could  go from  the current 
NGPA set of partial  controls to complete deregulation  of gas without 
any significant  effect on the price that  consumers  see on average. 
Nevertheless, complete deregulation  would have substantial  distri- 
butional  and  allocative  effects. Some  consumers  would  see considerably 
higher  prices  than  they are  paying  now  and  others  would  see considerably 
lower prices. The consequences of unifying  the price through  complete 
deregulation  would  be an unambiguous  efficiency  gain.  There  are  clearly 
unexploited gains from trade when one region pays $3 per thousand 
cubic feet to heat houses and another  pays $6 per thousand  cubic feet, 
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production  conditions. And there would be large  transfers  and redistri- 
bution  among  consumers.  The same  can  be said  about  production.  There 
are  allocative  inefficiencies  in production  because  NGPA subsidizes  the 
production  of very high-cost gas. Equalizing  wellhead prices would 
provide a more efficient supply of gas and would redistribute  income 
among  producers. 
However, little of the redistribution  that would take place under 
current  market  conditions  would  be between  producers  and  consumers. 
This  also means  that  this is a time  when  total  deregulation  would  produce 
almost no inflationary  or macroeconomic  consequences from the de- 
mand-side  effects. 
All of the above concerns market  equilibrium  conditions. The con- 
tracts problem  that Cooper describes is real, but it is a problem  under 
current  law as well as with total deregulation.  Contracts  will cause a 
large  price spike in 1985  even if there is only partial  deregulation  in that 
year, and may already  be forcing  excessively high  gas prices. It is not at 
all clear that total deregulation  makes  the problem  worse. I suspect  that 
by unifying  prices, total deregulation  would  help. 
I also do not feel that putting  off deregulation  is a way of solving  this 
contracts problem. It reduces the incentive to reach voluntary  agree- 
ments and leaves substantial  market  distortions  in place. There  are two 
more  direct  ways to address  the contracts  problem. 
One is renegotiation;  and my conversations  with participants  in the 
industry indicate that no one feels they are served well by existing 
contracts. Producers,  pipelines, and distributors  all see that if onerous 
contract provisions are enforced, they will be worse off than if they 
negotiate  out a price at which the gas could be marketed  by pipelines. 
I think the solution is either to let the market take care of those 
contracts problems, or try a relatively simple legislative fix. Simply 
legislating  a one-time market  out of which everyone can renegotiate  a 
contract  that  would  otherwise  have a price  that spikes  above the market 
equilibrium  level would  probably  deal with  the situation  without  perpet- 
uating  the inefficiencies  of continued  regulation. 
I would like to point out possible implications  for oil imports  of the 
current  large  regional  price differentials.  In some regions  consumers  are 
being  driven  off gas, especially industrial  and  utility  customers,  because 
its price has gone above the cost of competing  fuels. In these regions  oil 
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parity  level that bringing  it up to the national  average probably  would 
not affect  fuel choice decisions very much. 
This asymmetry-which comes out of the fact that there is no single 
national  price for gas-can  reconcile the propositions  that deregulation 
may for a time produce a higher  average price for gas and higher  gas 
consumption.  But in the long run it is clear, and is stated in the DOE 
Study cited, that total deregulation  gives higher  price and lower con- 
sumption  than will the NGPA. As supply  depends  increasingly  on new 
discoveries and  development,  the market-clearing  price  will rise. 
How should we evaluate a change  in oil imports?  I would argue  that 
as a matter  of public  policy it is a bad  idea to use a regulatory  scheme to 
subsidize  additional  production  of gas. The  problems  of the  NGPA  would 
be magnified  if there were another sudden increase in the price of oil. 
The gas industry would remain hamstrung  by price regulations  that 
prevent  drawing  on its ability  to produce  and distribute  substitute  fuels 
for imported  oil. 
As a means of enhancing  energy security, reducing  oil imports  is less 
important  than building  a system that is more flexible in responding  to 
price changes. Total deregulation  of natural  gas would provide that 
increase  in flexibility. 
General Discussion 
Robert  Hall  was critical  of the DOE  Study's conclusion  that  immediate 
gas decontrol  would  raise  oil imports,  reasoning  that,  if there  is presently 
a gas shortage,  price decontrol  will raise prices and stimulate  additional 
gas output,  in which case oil imports  would be expected to decline. And 
if there is no shortage,  decontrol  will affect neither  prices nor imports. 
In fact, Hall believed that even if there is a shortage  in areas that are 
controlled, it is doubtful that any aggregate shortage exists. Conse- 
quently the macroeconomic impact that would come from decontrol 
may  be small  and  is quite  different  from  that  which  resulted  from  the rise 
in the world oil prices. With respect to contract  gas prices that are far 
above the equilibrium  price, Hall pointed out that current  commercial 
law permits  the buyer  to breach  such contracts,  with  the buyer  compen- 
sating  the seller for this breach. In the context of long-term  contracts, 
any price surprise  from  decontrol  would confer  rents  on either  buyer  or 
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price  and  the market-clearing  price, buyer  and seller  would  renegotiate. 
Therefore there cannot be any important discrepancy between the 
allocative price that governs consumption and the efficient, market- 
clearing price. Christopher Sims noted that the idea that contract 
renegotiations  would  be allocatively  efficient  depends  on the assumption 
that both buyer and seller are in competitive markets.  For example, if 
gas pipelines have substantial  market  power they might  decide to pass 
through  the inefficiently  high price to final  consumers,  causing  a misal- 
location  of resources. 
William  Nordhaus questioned several points in Hall's analysis. He 
reasoned  that whether  gas production  would rise with decontrol  would 
depend  on technical  characteristics  of gas production  and  the way prices 
are  set. If  regulators  set a relatively  low price  on wells in  which  production 
is relatively  inelastic but set high  prices on wells in which production  is 
elastic, it is very possible  that  production  would  decline  under  decontrol. 
Furthermore,  as Cooper observes in his paper, if there is currently 
excess demand for gas, then whether imports will rise or fall under 
decontrol depends on how the present shortages have been allocated 
among consumers. As to the macro impacts, Nordhaus again agreed 
with Cooper that there would be a short-term  but potentially severe 
decline in real output if the authorities failed to accommodate the 
increased  prices. He found it likely that  this loss would  be considerably 
above any allocational  gains  from  decontrol. 
Hendrik  Houthakker  argued  that U.S. experience with oil decontrol 
should  lead us to be more sanguine  than  Cooper  about  prospects  under 
gas decontrol. Contrary  to previous predictions, the price of gasoline 
fell rather  than  rose after  decontrol  in 1981.  Citing  a study  by the National 
Commission  on Supplies and Shortages, Houthakker  claimed  that the 
main  cause of the gasoline lines in 1973  and 1974  was the price control 
program  then in effect. Taking  into account  the undesirable  side effects 
of the present  gas controls  and  those likely  under  decontrol,  he preferred 
immediate  decontrol if it were combined with a windfall  profits tax. 
George  Perry  observed that most product  prices had been decontrolled 
before 1981  and the main  surprise  was not about  the effect of decontrol 
on gasoline  prices  but  about  the effect of world  recession  on world  prices 
for crude  oil. 
Sims pointed  out a more  subtle  problem  with controlled  prices  in this 
context. Since gas is an exhaustible  resource, the price  plays two roles. 394  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
In  addition  to allocating  among  current  users, the rate  of growth  of prices 
affects the rate of exhaustion of resources. This implies that both the 
level and rate of growth of prices must respond  in a particular  way to 
remain  efficient  in changing  market  situations.  Any benefit  of gas price 
regulation  should therefore be weighted against  the likelihood  of sub- 
stantial errors by regulators  in solving the complicated  problem  they 
face. 
Barry  Bosworth  suggested  that  the macroeconomic  impacts  of dereg- 
ulation  were probably  exaggerated  in Cooper's paper. The first reason 
is that  the DOE Study, on which some of the analysis  rests, is no longer 
relevant  because the market  for energy is no longer tight. The second 
reason is that the controls have never been as effective as they were 
originally  intended  to be and  as they are  popularly  thought  to be. Private 
agents in the natural  gas market  are far more ingenious  in avoiding  the 
strictures  of the NGPA than  regulators  are in enforcing  them. Bosworth 
objected  to the present  controls mainly  because they would  prevent  the 
authorities  from  rationally  responding  to energy-supply  disruptions.  The 
NGPA  simply  prevents  reallocation  of gas  from  surplus  areas  to shortage 
areas, and  hence exacerbates  the energy  problems  the nation  would  face 
in the event of an interruption  in supply. 